MISSILE OFFENCE AND MISSILE DEFENSE IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

 

By Uzi Rubin

 

• While the missile campaign during Operation Iraqi Freedom drew scant attention, it was “A Glimpse of the future”.
• The Iraqis fired 19 ballistic missiles and 5 improvised cruise missiles. 9 ballistic missiles were engaged, all engagement resulting in the successful destruction of the hostile missiles. The other 10 ballistic missiles impacted harmlessly in empty areas and in the sea. 22 Patriot interceptors were fired, 4 of them of the new hit-to-kill PAC3 missiles. However, none of the 5 cruise missiles were either detected or engaged.
• For the first time, ballistic missile launchers were pinpointed by the defense and destroyed in near real time by friendly air power
• The success of the Patriot system was dampened by incidents of fratricide. Compared however to its indifferent performance during Operation Desert Strom, the results of the recent engagements should be gratifying.

 

   Unlike what transpired in the 1991 Gulf War, the missile campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) received only minor attention and media coverage. The pre-war apprehensions in Israel and elsewhere of massive Iraqi missile attacks, including the use of WMD warheads, proved illusory. In all, the Iraqis fired 19 short range ballistic missiles (BM) of the Ababil and El Samoud types[1], as well as 5 improvised land attack cruise missiles (CM)[2] at Coalition targets in Kuwait and Iraq itself. Of the 19 attacking BMs, 9 were engaged, all engagements ending successfully in the destruction the incoming missiles. Both the improved PAC 2 and the new PAC 3 interceptors were used, the PAC 3’s downing two Iraqi missiles. Moreover, three of the El Samoud launchers were located and destroyed by US Navy and Air Force aircraft[3]. In contrast, none of the launched CMs were either engaged or destroyed. However, some unfired CMs seem to have been captured intact by British ground troops in Basra[4].

    

This short yet sharp action drew scant media attention due to the near absence of missile related casualties and damage, and by the spectacular fratricidal downing of Coalition aircraft by the defending Patriot batteries. This remarkably tepid interest in the Patriot’s OIF successes against hostile missiles was further dampened by the Pentagon’s justified reluctance to make premature claims of success, in view of its controversial claims soon after operation Desert Storm in 1991.

 

While understandable from public relations perspective, this lack of public exposure is hardly justified because of the military and political significance of the OIF missile campaign. This was, as one high ranking US officer said, “A glimpse of the future”. Several “Firsts” in missile warfare were scored both by the offense and the defense. For the first time, very short-range ballistic missiles were fired at command posts and rear installations of an invading army. For the first time, improvised land attack cruise missiles were fired by a third world country against population centers. The new Hit to Kill Pac 3 interceptor made its debut in this campaign. For the first time, missile defenses provided a reliable shield against hostile ballistic missiles, repeatedly downing the incoming threats. It was the first time ever that ballistic missile launchers were accurately pinpointed by the missile defense radars and destroyed in near real time. The last two “Firsts” stand in sharp contrast to the 1991 Gulf War failures both in destroying incoming ballistic missiles and in locating and destroying their launchers. 

   

The picture, however, still lacks some crucial features. While the available sources indicate that a total of 22 patriot missiles were fired against the 9 engaged missiles, it is not yet clear how many of the newest PAC –3 Hit to Kill rounds were used. Since the Patriot system routinely fires a ripple of two missiles at any engaged threat, the excess of 4 Patriot rounds fired at the 9 targets could be explained by more than one battery simultaneously engaging the same target. The remarkably high ratio between BMs fired and BMs engaged – 19 to 9 – also raises some questions. The missiles fired by the Iraqis were not too inaccurate for their ranges, and it stands to reason that all of them were fired against significant military targets. Why then were only 9 Iraqi missiles - less than one half of the total number - engaged by the Patriot batteries?  One explanation could be a very low reliability of the Iraqi missiles – less than 50% - with malfunctions leading to early flight terminations or huge navigational errors which shifted the impact points to open deserts or the sea, thereby triggering a “hold fire” command. Another explanation could be that the unengaged Iraqi missiles were intentionally targeted at points located outside of the Patriot’s defensive envelopes. Since there were no reported losses or damages from unengaged Iraqi BM’s, the first explanation seems more likely. Finally, the cost exchange ratio seemed to be quite stressing for the defense: Surely the cost of the 22 fired Patriots far outstripped the cost of the 9 downed Iraqi missiles.

   

All in all, the outcome of the missile campaign during OIF should be encouraging from Israel’s point of view. It validated, albeit in a more benign environment, Israel’s decision to invest in a national missile shield. It specifically validated the improved PAC 2 GEM system, deployed by Israel as the lower tier of that missile shield. At the same time, the appearance of Iraqi land attack cruise missiles, low key and improvised as it was, should be a source of future concern for Israel’s defense planners.